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MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ PROTECTION IN
THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL MARKET
Apri Sya’bani *

Abstract
This paper explores the regulatory reform in Indonesia corporate governance along
with capital market regulatory framework which has continuously been conducted
in response to enhance minority shareholders’ protection and the implementation of
corporate governance in public listed companies, particularly in protecting minority
shareholder right through three short cases studies. The three cases analysed in
this paper show that the implementation of corporate governance in public listed
companies is still weak, resulting from the lack of awareness of how to implement
corporate governance by the public listed companies, the opportunistic behaviour of
public listed companies using loopholes in the regulations to the weaknesses in the
enforcement of capital markets law.
Keywords: shareholder protection, capital market regulations, good corporate
governance.
Abstrak
Makalah ini membahas reformasi regulasi dalam tata kelola perusahaan Indonesia
bersama dengan pasar modal kerangka peraturan yang telah terus-menerus dilakukan
dalam menanggapi untuk meningkatkan perlindungan pemegang saham minoritas dan
penerapan tata kelola perusahaan di perusahaan publik, terutama dalam melindungi
pemegang saham minoritas kanan melalui tiga kasus pendek penelitian. Tiga kasus yang
dianalisis dalam makalah ini menunjukkan bahwa penerapan tata kelola perusahaan
di perusahaan publik yang terdaftar masih lemah, akibat kurangnya kesadaran tentang
bagaimana menerapkan tata kelola perusahaan oleh perusahaan publik yang terdaftar,
perilaku oportunistik perusahaan publik yang terdaftar dengan menggunakan celah
dalam peraturan untuk kelemahan dalam penegakan hukum pasar modal.
Kata Kunci: Perlindungan Pemegang Saham, Peraturan Pasar Modal, Tata Kelola
Perusahaan yang Baik

I. Introduction
In the era of globalization and high economic competition, strengthening
the capital markets might be seen as a key economic project. This is because a
well-developed capital market will bring immense advantages to developing
the economy of the nation.1 For instance, the capital markets provide sources of
funding for industries as they expand to take advantage of emerging markets. While
a well-developed capital market could bring immense advantages to the country’s
*
Legal Counsel Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia. The author can be contacted at
aprisaban@gmail.com
1
P A Isenmila and Akinola Adewale, ‘The Role of Capital Market in Emerging Company’ (2012)
2 (6) International Journal of Business and Social Research 62. See also, The Asian Development Bank,
Strengthening Indonesia’s Capital Market, Project Data Sheets Updated as of 31 March 2014 <http://www.
adb.org/projects/32507-032/details>.
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economy, the fact shows that the current position of Indonesian stock market,
compared to Indonesia’s nearest neighbours such as Malaysia and Singapore is
considerably small.2
There are various reasons why the Indonesia capital market is not able
to attract larger numbers of investors. In terms of business legal environment,
previous several studies refer to the poor investor protection.3 While there
have been many improvements on the regulatory framework to protect investors,
the lack of implementation of the law is still an obstacle. Apparently, a highly
concentrated ownership structure in the Indonesian companies led to the weakness
in corporate governance.4
In this regard, minority shareholder protection is an important element for
investors to make a decision to invest in public listed companies. Considering
this background, this paper explores the regulatory reform in Indonesia corporate
governance along with capital market regulatory framework which has continuously
been conducted in response to enhance minority shareholders’ protection and the
implementation of corporate governance in public listed companies, particularly in
protecting shareholder right through three short cases studies.
Although there have been several studies discussing the weak protection
of investors in Indonesia, this paper points out the regulations which cover the
protection of investors choosing to invest in public listed companies, and analyzes
the current cases that depict the type of shareholders’ expropriation. This paper
then examines the response of capital market supervisory agency in enforcing
those cases. The rationale for examining current cases is to frame an argument that
if there has been an improvement on the regulatory framework to protect investors
in Indonesian capital market, there should have been less chance for companies to
expropriate shareholders’ right.5

However, the three cases analysed in this paper show that the expropriation
of minority shareholders still occurs. The reason for weak shareholders’ protection
ranges from the lack of awareness of how to implement corporate governance
by the public listed companies, to the opportunistic behaviour of public listed
companies using loopholes in the regulations and weaknesses in the enforcement
of capital markets law.
As it plays a dominant role in the area of regulating the capital markets, the
2
ADB, Asia Capital Market Monitor, Aug 2011 reported that market capitalization in Indonesia was
only about 371,3 US$ billion or 45,1% of GDP, compared to Malaysia 170,8% and Singapore 223,4% of GDP.
3
See, i.e. The Asian Development Bank, Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia 2 cited in
William E Daniel, ‘Corporate Governance in Indonesian Listed Companies – A Problem of Legal Transplant
- Special Issue: Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2003) 15 (1) Bond Law Review 5, Rafael la Porta,
Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, ‘Corporate Ownership Around The World’
(1999) 54 (2) The Journal of Finance, 769 and the World Bank Report, Press Release-Shareholder Rights,
Transparency Key to Capital Market Development, December 12, 2010 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2010/12/12/shareholder-rights-transparency-key-capital-market-developmentnew-wb-report>.
4
The Asian Development Bank, Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia, 2 cited in William
E Daniel, ‘Corporate Governance in Indonesian Listed Companies – A Problem of Legal Transplant - Special
Issue: Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2003) 15 (1) Bond Law Review 5.
5
In firms with concentrated ownership, the conflict of interest between majority or controlling
and minority shareholders becomes an important issue that might lead to the expropriation behavior by
controlling shareholders, such as through equity tunneling which dilute minority shareholders’ shares.
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capital markets supervisory agency has mostly been criticized in responding to
expropriation of minority shareholders. Yet, in relation to its role and the power
given to the agency by the law, there are tensions between its primary function as a
‘gatekeeper’ in the securities market, and the extent to which its power reaches out
to protect investors. In relation to that, this paper argues that there is an extensive
power of the agency to enforce the law, yet that power is not accompanied by an
enforcement strategy. As a consequence, there has been unlimited discretion in
enforcing the law. Without a clear approach to enforcement, it has a tendency to
create an inconsistency in legal enforcement.
This paper’s goal in examining the above cases and exploring capital market
regulations and its enforcement is to gain an understanding not only of the legal
issues and challenges that exist in implementing capital market regulations in
the area of investor protection but also to possibly recommend possible ways to
improve the law enforcement in order to ensure effective protection of shareholders
in the Indonesian capital market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section of this
paper provides the legal framework of the Indonesian capital market. Section III
explains the role of the supervisory agency in capital markets. Section IV examines
current cases which illustrate types of shareholder expropriation and the role of
supervisory agency in responding to such cases. The last section of this paper gives
recommendations and conclusion.

II. An Overview of the Indonesian Capital Market, its Law and
Derivative Regulations
A. Indonesian Stock Market to date

The capital market is one of the key drivers of a nation’s economic
growth. Currently, there has been 501 Public Listed Companies in Indonesian
capital market. The share ownership composition is still dominated by
foreign investors at 57.80%, while the major share ownership based on the
type of investors is dominated by corporate, followed by financial institution.
6
Indonesia is ASEAN’s largest economy7, but the markets remain uncompetitive
by ASEAN countries comparison and unrepresentative of the economy as a whole.8
Compared to its regional peers, Indonesian capital markets are smaller.
Securities and equity markets are relatively underdeveloped and market
capitalization of Indonesia’s listed companies is lower than that of its regional
peers.9
6
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, Statistik Pasar Modal, 30 September – 4 Oktober 2013 [Financial Services Authority Capital Market Statistic Report, September 30-October 4, 2013] 30-5 <http://www.ojk.go.id/
DocLib/ViewDocumentPDF.aspx?DocumentGuidId=f5fc5215-5be5-4823-80cb-4c7afa72e21c>.
7
ASEAN Latin Business Forum 2012-Towards a Sustainable Future, Indonesia <http://www.
asean-latin2012.com/indonesia.html>.
8
Global Business Guide Indonesia, Finance Capital Markets Overview (2012) <http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/finance/article/2011/capital_markets_overview.php>.
9
Based on the data of the World Bank, Indonesian market capitalization of listed companies in
2012 was US$ 396,772,107,424. Compared to Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesian market capitalization
was smaller than them. Malaysia was 476,340,035,965 and Singapore was 414,125,808,743. Indonesia-
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The growth of business groups with political connections has been the
main problem of the Indonesian corporate governance, particularly in the era of
former president Suharto’s new order government, whereby the mix of politics and
business led to rampant corruption.10 After the fall of the Suharto regime, there are
still doubts about the continuity of conflict of interest which occurs when family
members and close associates of government officials conduct their business. In
relation to the degree of protection of investors’ interest, it has been argued that the
political power of group affiliates have preferential access to extracting more value
from a weak legal enforcement environment. 11

On the side of domestic investors, there have been several issues which
make Indonesians less interested in investing in capital market, such as lack
of knowledge about investment in capital market. Meanwhile, this condition
has been compounded by the trauma of being cheated by investment brokers.
For example, the securities scam involving PT Sarijaya Permana Sekuritas 12
and PT Antaboga Delta Sekuritas13 had severe negative repercussions and caused
big financial losses to investors, diminishing the investors’ trust on capital market.
From the perspective of foreign investors, the Indonesian legal environment,
particularly in relation to protection of shareholders14, firm-level corporate
governance,15 become considerable issues in deciding invest in Indonesian
capital market.
B. Indonesian Financial Services Authority: Regulating and Supervising the
Market

To help public investors make informed investments decisions and to
protect them from harmful and illegal practices, a Capital Market Supervisory
Agency is authorized to administer and supervise the capital market. The
Capital Market Supervisory Agency has authorities to enforce the Law and
ensure the capital market is conducted in an orderly and fair maner. Previously,
Indonesian capital markets were supervised by the Capital Markets and
Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK). Bapepam-LK’s
Chair was appointed by the President and was responsible to the Minister of
Finance. Before purely conducting its functions as a supervisor, Bapepam16 was

Investments, Finance <www.indonesia-investments.com/finance/item6>.
10
Bill Guerin, ‘Politics and business mix in Indonesia’, Asia Times (online), 22 July 2006 <http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG22Ae01.html>.
11
Ibid.
12
Ika Krismantari and Dicky Christanto, ‘Sarijaya Named in Securities Scam’ The Jakarta Post (online), 7 January 2009 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/07/sarijaya-named-securitiesscam.html>.
13
Ramona Sofiannew Dewi, Bonardo Maulana Wahono, Archie Ardian, ‘Antaboga Mutual Funds
Investigated’, VivaNews (online), 3 December 2008 <http://m.news.viva.co.id/news/read/13359-antaboga_mutual_funds_investigated>.
14
Akbar Komijani and Habib Soheili Ahmadi,’ Analysis of the Role of Protecting Shareholders
Rights in Expanding Stock Market in a Selected Developing Countries’ (2012) 3 (17) International Journal
of Business and Social Science.
15
Chandrasekhar Krisnamurti, Aleksandar Sevic and Zeljo Sevic, ‘Legal Environment, Firm-level
Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia’ (2005) 38 Economic Change
and Restructuring.
16
Before Bapepam-LK, the organization which supervised capital market area was Bapepam. This
supervisory agency then integrated with financial institutions supervisory agency under the Bapepam-LK.
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also an organizer of the stock exchange. In 1990, these twin tasks were eliminated.
Bapepam then focused on its function as a supervisor in capital market. In
December 2005 by a merger with the Directorate General of Financial Institutions,
it became Bapepam-LK. After the merger, the authority covers the supervision
of insurance and pension industries. In supervising capital market industries,
Bapepam-LK has authorities to guide capital market industry, including enacts
technical regulations, supervises on day to day market activities, investigates the
capital market violations, and imposes sanctions.
However, the current organization structure and supervisory approach
maintain separate structure for each sectore. For example, the organization structure
has separate chief excecutives for capital market, non-bank financial institution,
and banking.17 With this structure, OJK may face an obstacle to leverage or adopt
a fully integrated approach to supervision. Therefore, one of the priority tasks is
to enhance cross-sectoral knowledge and fully integrate capital market, non-bank
financial institution, and banking supervision under OJK. In other words, OJK
must immediately harmonise supervisory approaches across sectors, and develop
reporting structures and processes in order to prevent supervisory team in each
sector work in sectoral framework.18
Report by OJK indentifies that at least 31 conglomerates in the financial
services sector which mostly controlled by bank. They also have a limited amount
of non-banking financial business.19 An integrated approach to supervise financial
services is important since the existence of conglomerates in the Indonesia financial
services industry might expose risks associated with this type of grouping company,
such as concentration of family ownership, pyramiding, and cross shareholding.
The power given by the law

Because the current Capital Market Law and its implementing
regulations are yet to be revised and the cases explained in this article occured
before the transition from Bapepam LK to OJK, further explanations of this
article sometimes still refer to the former organization, either Bapepam or
Bapepam LK.
Most of the provisions of the Law No 8 of 1995 Concerning Capital
Market (the Capital Market Law) give authority to OJK (former Bapepam LK),
yet they do not give strict obligations to enforce the law such as in investigating
criminal violation in capital market. For instance in Article 5 states:

“In order to carry out the provisions of Articles 3 and 4, BAPEPAM shall
have authority to:
a. Inspect and investigate any Person with respect to suspected violations of
this Law or its implementing regulations;…”
Similarly, Article 100 states:

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, ‘Struktur Organisasi OJK’ < http://www.ojk.go.id/struktur-organisasi >.
Financial Stability Board (2014) ‘Peer Review of Indonesia-Review Report’, FSB Report.
19
Fathan Qorib, Andin Aditya Rahman (2014 ) ‘Facing AEC, OJK Prepares Banking Sector’s Resilience Policy’, hukumonline, 27 June <http://en.hukumonline.com/pages/lt5379bf7ed8ff2/facing-aec-ojkprepares-banking-sector-s-resilience-policy>.
17
18
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(1) “Bapepam may initiate a formal investigation of any person suspected
of violating or being involved in a violation of this Law and/or its
implementing regulations.”
The above provisions imply that OJK has discretionary powers to
supervise the markets. Consequently, major regulatory activities taken by OJK
are based on discretion. This includes the enforcement of measures which
involve allegations for criminal conduct. The case of Bank Pikko is one of
examples in which OJK used their discretionary power to discontinue criminal
investigation.20 If OJK decides not to proceed with an investigation, a common
measure taken by Bapepam is to impose administrative sanctions.21 This would be
based on Article 102 which provides for the imposition of administrative sanctions
for violations of the Capital Market Law and its implementing regulations. This
provision makes the imposition of administrative sanctions to even criminal
violations as long as this violation is governed by the Capital Market Law.
Generally, OJK might use this provision on criminal violation in capital markets
where Bapepam considers not preceding with a criminal investigation.

The approach of regulatory enforcement taken by OJK is similar to that of
ASIC (the Australian Securities and Investments Commission). The conceptual
regulatory organization framework taken by ASIC tends to be transactionfocused. For instance, it draws up notices to seek information in response
to a complaint about misconduct or commence a formal investigation into
suspected misconduct with a view to bringing administrative, civil or criminal
action against violations if the evidence supports it.22

However, one should note that the conceptual regulatory framework
that created the ASIC authority supplied that policy.23 Although, the typical
authority provisions which empower Bapepam to conduct its supervision tend to
be exercised by discretion, a clear policy direction should lead OJK in exercising its
discretion. In the Capital Market Law there are no precise requirements concerning
enforcement. The only clear conceptual underpinning what drives Indonesian capital
market policy implementation is to ensure the investors protection. In regards to
this objective, an approach of enforcement in capital market should proportionally
20
Elucidation of art 101 Law No 8 of 1995 Concerning Capital Market states that:
‘Capital Market misbehaviour varies in type, modus operandi, and potential for loss. For this reason, BAPEPAM is authorized to consider the consequences of a violation and has discretion to proceed with
an investigation, based on its judgment. BAPEPAM is not required to initiate a criminal investigation for
every violation of this Law and its implementing regulations, since such a course of action might inhibit
general business in the Securities market. When the harm inflicted endangers the Capital Market system,
the interests of investors or the public, or when a settlement is not reached with respect to losses, BAPEPAM may initiate a criminal investigation. The Chairman of BAPEPAM orders the initiation of investigations
by Criminal Investigators on BAPEPAM staff.’
21
Article 102 the Law No 8 of 1995 Concerning Capital Market states that ‘Bapepam may impose
administrative sanctions for violations of this Law and/or its implementing regulations against every Person that is licensed, approved or registered with Bapepam’.
22
Justin O’Brien, Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the Dinamics of Capital Market Regulation (Imperal College, Press 2007) 9.
23
The provision which given ASIC authority is stipulated in s 1 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (cth). Malcolm Rodgers, former Executive Director, Regulation at the ASIC
stated that ‘the Act and other legislation we administer create obligations for us and give us extensive and
sometimes intrusive powers to go about our job…. Some parts of it hang together and look like the product
of a single mind; others are a patchwork of history, politics, and sometimes dubious drafting.’
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employ an accommodative and a sanctioning approach to compliance.
A common policy of enforcement in the capital market is to enforce
administrative sanctions rather than criminal sanctions. The enforcement of the
Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK capital market supervisory agency
can be given as an example. In UK, the enforcement approach of FSA is in favour
to the administrative nature of the disciplinary process because of flexibility and
the less costly formal court procedures. The FSA also learn from the failure to
bring deterrence from the criminal sanctions to market abuse contraventions. The
approach of FSA also derives from the proposition that:
[A]dministrative sanctions would provide much greater flexibility to
bring to book individuals and organizations who had escaped the regulatory
net as a result of the evidential and procedural safeguards of the criminal law.24
Even though nowadays Indonesia has moved to the integrated approach
similar to the UK’s financial supervisory institution, a further research need
to be taken to assess as to whether a similar approach of enforcement can be
adopted in the case of Indonesian capital market.

C. Law and Regulations in relation to Shareholders Rights

Before exploring shareholders’ experiences in pursuing their rights
in Indonesian capital market and consider how to improve protection of
investors in the Indonesian capital market, particularly in relation to minority
shareholders protection in Indonesian Public Listed Companies, it is important
to understand legal framework which covers the protection of minority
shareholders. Besides disclosure regulations, the protection of investors in
Indonesian capital market is stipulated through regulations which define the
mechanism of the change of control transactions, particularly through the
imposition of mandatory bid and disclosure requirements in the takeovers
laws.

1. General Legal Framework
How the rights of shareholders are protected in a company has a
correlation with how a company is governed. Having said that, the discussion
on the protection of shareholders cannot be separated from the corporate
governance principles which are implied in Indonesian Law. As soft law, the
Indonesian Code of Good Corporate Governance sets out principles of good
corporate governance which cover the protection component of shareholders
rights. According to the Indonesian Code of Good Corporate Governance, the
rights of shareholders that need to be protected as follows:25
a. the right to attend, express an opinion, and vote in the General
Meeting of Shareholders based on the provision that one share
entitles the right of the holder to issue one vote;
24
An Article by Iain MacNeil, ‘Enforcement of Capital Markets Regulation: The United Kingdom
and Its International Markets’ compiled in Justin O’Brien, Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the
Dinamics of Capital Market Regulation (Imperal College, Press 2007) 175.
25
The Indonesian Code of Good Corporate Governance cited in William E Daniel, above n 4, 16.
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b. the right to obtain information regarding the company on a timely,
proper and regular basis, except with respect to confidential matters,
so that the shareholders can make a decision in relation to their
investment in the company based on accurate information;
c. the right to receive shares of profit appropriated for shareholders in
the form of dividends and other profit sharing, in proportion to the
shares owned;
d. the right to obtain full explanation and accurate information with
regard to the procedures to be met in relation to the convening of
the General Meeting of Shareholders in order for the shareholders to
participate in decisions, including those affecting the existence of the
company and the rights of the shareholders;
e. in the event that there is more than one type and classification of
shares in the company, then: (i) each shareholder is entitled to cast
a vote in accordance with the type, classification and number of
shares owned; and (ii) each shareholder is entitled to obtain a fair
treatment based on the type and classification of the share owned.
The implementation of those codes is stipulated in the Indonesian
Company Law, Capital Market Law and its implementing regulations. Generally,
the law concerning general limited company is governed by Indonesian
Company Law. However, once the market participants engage in Indonesian
capital market activities, such as as issuers, they should also pay attention
to the law that governs the capital market and its derivative regulations.
However, the law that governs public listed company refers to Company Law
if there is no specific matter governed by Capital Market law. Thus, Company
Law serves as the “lex generalis” for Capital Market Law.

A key feature of Company law is to reduce the opportunistic behaviours
among stakeholders. Therefore, compared to the capital market law, the
company law is more elaborate in regulating and reducing the conflict
between managers and shareholders, among shareholders themselves, and
between shareholders and the related stakeholders of the company.’26 On the
other hand, as it has been standardized by International Financial Organizations,27
the Indonesian Capital Market Law and its implementing regulations is more focus
on ensuring market conduct through disclosure. The objective of the Indonesian
Capital Market Law can be seen from its provision that in order to develop capital
market, ‘its activity must be supervised to ensure that the capital market is orderly,
fair, and efficient’.28 Furthermore, the Law has mandated that the supervision of
26
Konrad Zweigert and hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, (Oxford University Press,
1998) 4 cited in Yozua Makes, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for the Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations: General Framework and Analysis from Dutch Law and Theoretical Perspectives’ (2012) Makes International Law Journal 79.
27
Most of the Securities Regulations in many jurisdictions have been standardized according
to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). ‘IOSCO is a multilateral forum for
standard-setting and co-operation between national securities regulators’. IOSCO has ‘triple goals of investor protection, market efficiency and systemic stability.’ This information is extracted from: Robert Baxt,
Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (Lexis Nexis Butterrworths, 8th
ed, 2012) 10.
28
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] elucidation of art 3 [unofficial English
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capital market must ensure the protection of investors and public’ interest.29
In relation to shareholder protection, the basic protection has been regulated
by the Company Law, for instance, a right to equal treatment in which the law
stipulates that the shares of the same class confer to their holders the same
rights.30 Another basic right is the shareholders’ right to attend and vote in general
shareholders meeting. In addition, ‘each share shall have one right to vote, unless
the article of Association provides otherwise’.31
Shareholders also have a right to obtain corporate information in a timely
and on regular manner. The Company Law provides the basic right to obtain
information stipulating that ‘within six months after the close of the company
accounting year, the directors shall compile an annual report to the general
shareholders meeting after being examined by board of commissioners.’32

For Public Listed Companies, the Capital Market Supervisory Agency33 sets
another obligation to report material transactions to Financial Services Authority
and the Indonesian Stock Exchange within two days after the date of transaction.34
Further detailed obligations to disclose corporate information are regulated
in Capital Market law and its regulations will be discussed below.

2. Transparency through Disclosure Requirements
Generally, in the capital market, the regulations on publicly listed
companies are mostly related to disclosure and transparency principles. A
strong disclosure regime in financial markets is very important because it
has an impact on confidence of the investors. Under disclosure requirements,
public listed companies are expected to provide transparency regarding the
firm’s performance and governance to investors. As a common measure in
regulating the market, disclosure requirements provide reliable and timely
information to investors. Thus, it enables investors to make investment
decisions based on material information that they need.35
Generally, this type of regulation is similar among jurisdictions due to the

trans].

29
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the
Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] art 3 [unofficial English trans].
30
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 53(2) [unofficial
English trans].
31
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 72(1) [unofficial
English trans].
32
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 66(1) [unofficial
English trans].
33
Previously, Indonesian capital market is supervised by Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK). Recently, in 2013, the new integrated agency which supervises
all financial services institutions, including banking is established, namely Financial Services Authority. A
further discussion is explained in the next chapter.
34
Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan (hereinafter referred to as Bapepam-LK)
Rule Number IX.E.2 Concerning Material Transaction and Changing in Core Business.
35
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission, Principles for
Periodic Disclosure by Listed Entities, Final Report (February 2010) 3.
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standardization by the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO).36 In the Indonesian capital market, the disclosure requirements for public
listed company fall within two categories. Firstly, a primary market disclosure
requires a company to comply with disclosure requirements when a company
issues securities for the first time.37 Further requirements should be fulfilled by a
company through continuous disclosure such as annual report,38 financial report39
and the obligation to disclose material transactions,40 affiliated party transactions
and conflicts of interest in certain transactions.41

3. The Need for Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control
To avoid conflict of interest, the Financial Services Agency also regulates
disclosure for shareholders who own 5% or more of shares.42 However, this
rule only stipulates the obligation to inform the direct owners of shares. In order
to improve capital market transparency and to meet the International minimum
standard of corporate governance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) recommends that the Indonesian capital market
supervisory agency43 should ‘extend its disclosure requirement to include beneficial
ownership.’44
36
One of the main principles for issuers set by IOSCO is: ‘there should be full, accurate and timely
disclosure of financial result, risk and other information which is materials to investors’ decisions’. International Organization of Securities Commission, ‘Objective and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (June
2010) 8. IOSCO has many members such as Australia, US, and Canada. Although the IOSCO recommendations can be considerate as soft law to ensure its implementation, IOSCO sets individual settlement systems. Australia is one of the members of IOSCO. In Australia, regulations to protect minority shareholders
are also imposed by disclosure requirements. Robert Baxt, Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan, above n
22, 5.
37
There are many rules which regulate the mechanism of disclosure in initial public offering, such
as procedures to issuing prospectus in Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.A.1 Concerning General Requirements
Regarding Submission of a registration Statement, Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.A.8 Concerning Preliminary Prospectus and Information Memorandum, Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.C.1 Concerning Form and
Content of a Registration Statement for a Public Offering, Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.C.2 Concerning
Guidelines Concerning the Form and Content of a Sumary Prospectus for a Public Offering, Bapepam-LK
Rule Number IX.C.3 Concerning Guidelines Concerning the Form and Content of a Summary Prospectus for
a Public Offering.
38
Bapepam-LK Rule Number X.K.6 Concerning Obligation to submit annual report for Issuers or
Public Companies.
39
Bapepam-LK Rule Number X.K.2 Concerning Obligation to Submit Periodic Financial Statements.
40
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 Concerning Material Transaction and Changing in Core Business.
41
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.1 Concerning Conflicts of Interest on Certain Transactions.
42
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the
Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] art 87(2) and Bapepam-LK Rule
Number X.M.1 Concerning Disclosure Requirements for Certain Shareholders.
43
In 2012, Indonesia has a new and independent capital market supervisory agency which integrated with banks and other financial institutions under Financial Services Authority or Otoritas Jasa
Keuangan (OJK). Previously, the supervisory agency was a part of Ministry of Finance, namely Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan (Bapepam-LK). Meanwhile the supervision of bank was under
Bank Indonesia.
44
Fianna Jurdant, ‘Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Indonesia: Legislative and
Regulatory Policy Option for Sustainable Capital Markets’ (OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers
No 9, OECD, 2013) 8.
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However, Bapepam Rule45 Number X.M.1 Concerning Disclosure
Requirements for Certain Shareholders does not cover the obligation to inform the
indirect owners. This rule does not extend a requirement for persons who are able
to acquire such owner’s own initiative and who have the power to vote or to direct
the voting or to dispose or to direct the disposition of one or more outstanding
shares of a company to disclose their indirect owners.46 Thus, it is argued that
investors still find a difficulty in identifying the ultimate beneficial owner.
Furthermore, it has been argued that with the current minimum requirement
to provide disclosure of direct equity ownership, this regulation might not be
effective because of the practice of omnibus account maintained by a custodian
or sub-custodian. Commonly, the account opened by market players in Indonesian
Central Securities Depository (Kustodian Sentral Efek Indonesia/ KSEI) by the
rule is undertaken through Securities Company and Custodian Bank.47
While Indonesian corporate governance system is characterized by
concentrated ownership, the existence of a disclosure framework that provides
information in the beneficial ownership and control structures of public listed
company is necessary. In the absent of ultimate ownership and control reporting
mechanism, the expropriation of minority shareholders potentially might not be
detected. For instance, a controlling shareholder might force management to enter
related party transaction or employ a strategy to extract resources and assets from
the company that he controls. It then possibly leads to insider trading or dilutive
share issues.48
4. Misleading Information
In the financial market, there are various types of defective disclosures in
connection with securities and other financial products.49 For instance, breach
of disclosure of bidder’s statement or a takeover offer document and disclosure
of a prospectus of offer information statement. Another breach of disclosure is a
misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial product, such as securities.50
Principally, a breach of those disclosure regimes may make persons liable
to investors for defective disclosure. Furthermore, as this might result in loss to
the investors, there is usually a mechanism for ‘a person who owns or acquires a
security in the primary or secondary market to claim for damages or other remedies
arising out of that defective disclosure.’ 51
In Indonesia, the disclosure regime for public listed companies, Indonesian
45
This regulation was enacted when the capital market supervisory agency (Bapepam) was still
separated from financial institutions supervision under the Directorate General of Financial Institutions.
Both institutions were under Ministry of Finance. When both Bapepam and Directorate General of Financial Institutions were merged, the institution was called Bapepam-LK.
46
Fianna Jurdant, above n 39, 9.
47
Bapepam-LK Rule Number III.C.7 Concerning Securities Sub Account With Central Securities
Depository, point 1c.
48
Fianna Jurdant, above n 39, 13.
49
Robert Baxt, Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan, above n 39, 311.
50
These types of defective disclosure are taken in the regime of investor protection provisions in
Australia Securities and Financial Services Regulations. Robert Baxt, Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan,
above n 39, 312.
51
Ibid.

Volume 4 Number 1, January - April 2014

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 125 ~

capital market law governs the claim for misleading information on the Registration
Statement of a Public Offering or misleading statement because of the omission
to provide material information required by the Capital Market Law and its
regulations.52 Likewise, for takeover, there is an obligation for the new owner ‘to
provide to the public information concerning the takeover no later than 2 working
days after the takeover’.53
The difference between the above two claims (misleading information in
registration statement and takeover announcement) is that for the first claim; the
statutory claim for loss or damage could refer to article 80(4) Capital Market
Law which provides specific recognition for the breach of misleading information
in a prospectus of offer information statement. Meanwhile for the misleading
information in takeover statement, the more general provision in article 111 Capital
Market Law provides the claim for losses arising from violation of this Law and
implementing regulations, including the regulation related to open company
takeover.54 For the implementation of corporate governance, Indonesian Capital
Market Law also specifies persons liable for defective disclosure, particularly for
misleading information in registration of initial public offering.55

While the law provides the mechanism to claim for investors’ loss due to
misleading information, the evidence of loss is an essential part for a plaintiff
to bring the case under the allegation of breach of misleading information. The
plaintiff must prove that he/she has suffered loss by conduct of a person or persons
in contravention of those sections. In terms of loss, the plaintiff must prove that
the loss that he/she suffered is caused by the conduct of that person; for example
that one was misled in the purchase of securities and consequently suffered loss.
Importantly, the plaintiff must prove that the loss did not derive from his/her fault
of calculation in investment decision.56
5. Market Conduct in relation to Takeover
The law governing takeovers is an essential matter for the development
of capital markets. If the process of takeover is conducted with proper
corporate governance, it can facilitate efficient exchange of shares in the
capital market with fair protection for all stakeholders.57 The law in relation
to takeovers differs from one to another and might depend on the market and
corporate structure. As in Indonesia, the corporate structure is mainly concentrated
in family group ownership. This shapes the takeover mechanism which might differ
from the market in which the dispersed ownership is dominated. As ownership is
concentrated, it is important to protecting the interests of minority shareholders
from the tendency of expropriation by the controlling shareholders. On the other
52
Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [The Law Number 8 Year 1995
Concerning Capital Market] art 80 (4) [unofficial English trans].
53
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.H.1 Concerning Open Company Takeover point 2(a).
54
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the
Republic of Indoensia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] art 111 [unofficial English trans].
55
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the
Republic of Indoensia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] art 80 [unofficial English trans].
56
Robert Baxt, Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan, above n 39, 339.
57
Yozua Makes, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for the Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations:
General Framework and Analysis from Dutch Law and Theoretical Perspectives’ (2012) Makes International Law Journal 4.
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hand, as the conflicting interests between shareholders and the management are
not an issue in corporate structure in the Indonesian market, friendly takeovers are
more common than hostile takeover.58
Takeover is one corporate action which might support an increase of
investment. Generally, takeover of a public company can be done by acquisition of
shares in the company. Under the Indonesian Company Law, acquisition is defined
as ‘a legal act performed by a legal entity or individual personal to acquire shares
in a company resulting in the change of control of the company’.59
The general rule of acquisition which is provided by the Indonesian company
Law requires a minimum quorum in the General Meeting of Shareholders where
‘at least three quarters of the total number of shares with voting rights is present or
represented in the GMS.’60 Furthermore, ‘the resolution is lawful if approved by at
least three quarters of the number of votes cast.’61
Meanwhile, for the takeover mechanism specified for a public company,
the capital market law as the lex specialis of the Company Law differs in the
procedures.62 The mechanism for the transfers of rights over shares traded on
capital markets is stipulated in Bapepam-LK Rule No. IX.H.1. 2011. Under this
specific regulation, the requirement to obtain approval from the GMS is excluded.
However, the approval might be obtained if it is required by other specific laws or
and regulations which govern the company’s line of business.63
Special attention should be given to Rule Number IX.H.1 Concerning Open
Company Takeover. This regulation requires disclosure, fairness and reporting for
open company takeover. There have been several updated versions until the last
regulation enacted in 2011 in order to response the aspiration of investors and legal
advisors. The first version was enacted in 2000, then amended and replaced in
2002. A further enactment was in 2008 which significantly changed the mandatory
selling requirement. As the takeover regulation has a correlation with the tender
offer regulation,64 this regulation was also being amended to adjust to the takeover
regulation.
In 2011, Bapepam-LK amended the regulation of tender offer which differs
58
Ibid 73-5. In a type of company’s structure which is characterized by the disperse ownership
structure, the common practice of takeover of public listed company is conducted by a hostile takeover, i.e.
public offer, it then leads to the acquisition. A public offer in the event of hostile takeover has a purpose to
balance the power between shareholders and management in relation to the takeover bid action. In a public offer process for example, a hostile offer or should consult with the target company for a certain period
and inform the bid price.
59
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 1(11) [unofficial
English trans].
60
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 89(1) [unofficial
English trans].
61
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 89(1) [unofficial
English trans].
62
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 56(5) [unofficial
English trans].
63
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.H.1 2011 Concerning Open Company Takeover point 3b.
64
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.F.1 Concerning Tender Offers.
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from the requirements and procedures for a mandatory tender offer and for a
voluntary tender offer. Thus, today, Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.H.1 regulates
the conduct of a mandatory tender offer and Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.F.1
regulates the voluntary tender offer procedure.
The intention of Bapepam-LK to revise the law concerning Open Company
Takeover in Regulation Number IX.H.1 in 2011 was to ‘increase an open
company’s shares liquidity and in order to provide more opportunity for investors
to access and or own open company’ shares.65 Meanwhile the revision of BapepamLK Rule Number IX.F.1 was in order to amend the law of voluntary tender offer
with the new mandatory tender offer procedures. The amendment is needed due to
the drastic revision of Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.H.1 in 2008.

The new regulation of takeover in open company changes the policy
of Mergers and Acquisitions in the country. The Capital Market Supervisory
Agency regulates the requirement for “mandatory offer” which occurs if a
takeover changes in a company’s control. Previously, the definition of company
controller which falls within the obligation of mandatory offer is for a share
ownership threshold of 25% or more. Under the new regulations, it increases
to more than 50%. The purpose of introducing the new rule is to increase
liquidity by requiring a share ownership threshold of more than 50% in order
to trigger a mandatory tender offer.
Unlike the old regulation which used “highest price” to calculate share
purchase price, the new regulations have a new method for calculating share
purchase price, namely “average highest price”. This new method minimizes
the possibility of price manipulation. For instance, due to leaked information,
the artificial price is created by inflating the market price.

6. Material Transaction
The Material Transaction rules are stipulated in Bapepam-LK Rule
Number IX.E.2 2011. Previous rules were published in 2009. In these new
rules, there are several improvements66 as follows. First, the definition of
material transaction is simplified. Material transactions that need to be disclosed
have a value of 20% to 50% of the public company’s equity. It must be disclosed
within two business days after the transaction which is counted after the signing of
the transaction documents.67 This revised provision clarifies the time to announce
information on a Material Transaction.
Secondly, the exemptions for material transaction are expanded. For instance,
if a company or its subsidiary companies receives loans, there is an exemption for
the grant of securities by a listed company to financial institutions, such as banks,

65
Consideration point a of the Decision of Chairman of Capital Market and Financial Institutions
Supervisory Agency Number: KEP-259/BL/2008 Concerning Open Company Takeover (Bapepam-LK Rule
Number IX.H.1 2008).
66
Herbert Smith, ‘Indonesia-changes to Bapepam-LK material transaction rule (Part 2) and clarification on currency law requirement to use Rupiah for payments’, e-bulletin, 20 December 2011 <http://
www.hbtlaw.com/uploads/File/publications/20111220%20%20%20Indonesia%20%20changes%20
to%20BapepamLK%20materialtransaction%20rule.htm>.
67
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 Concerning Material Transactions and Change of Main Business Activities, point 1 and point 2.
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venture capital companies, or infrastructure finance companies either onshore
or offshore.68 This provision clarifies the previous rule which did not explain the
scope of loans.
There also have been changes in relation to the business activities rules. If a
public listed company wants to change main business activity from its subsidiary
company, the prior approval from the public listed company’s shareholders is only
required if the contribution of the revenue of its subsidiary company is 20% or
more.69 Previously, the prior approval was required in all circumstances.70
7. Shareholder Litigation
One of the important methods and perhaps a pragmatic solution for
corporate governance is litigation as a derivative action protecting the rights
of shareholders. To protect the rights of minority shareholders, the Company
Law provides safeguards share holders on behalf of the company can take
an action against a member of the board of directors who due to his mistake
or negligence has caused the company to suffer a loss’.71 However, the right to
represent the company can only be exercised if a shareholder has at least 10% of
the issued shares with valid voting rights.72 This requirement can create barriers for
shareholders who only own small portions of shares and where there is apparent
dispersion of share ownership. Unfortunately, this provision does not open the
possibility for a minority shareholder who has shares less than 10% to collect the
voting rights from other shareholders in order to reach threshold.
To cope with the obstacle in the Company Law which limits the threshold
requirement, the Capital Market Law facilitates shareholders who suffer losses to
sue for compensation either jointly or severally with others with similar claim.73
Thus, there is no limitation or threshold for shareholders to sue against a member
of board who responsible for the company’s loss. This applies specifically to
shareholders in Public Listed Companies.
Basically, the Capital Market Law does not specifically facilitate shareholders
in relation to their rights in a Public Listed Company. The provision of Article 111
provides as follows:
Any Person who suffers losses arising from violations of this Law or
its implementing regulations can sue for compensation, either jointly or
severally with other Persons with similar claims, against the Person or

68
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 Concerning Material Transactions and Change of Main Business Activities, point 3.
69
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 Concerning Material Transactions and Change of Main Business Activities, point 4.
70
Herbert Smith, above n 61.
71
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 97(6) [unofficial
English trans].
72
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas [Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company] art 97(6) [unofficial
English trans]. See also the discussion in Benny S Tabalujan, Indonesian Company Law A Translation and
Commentary, (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 1997) 193.
73
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal [Law of the
Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning Capital Market] art 111 [unofficial English trans].
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Based on the above wording, this provision broadly applies to ‘any
person, a company, a partnership, an association or any organized group,
either when he/she acts as a plaintiff or defendant.’74 Another broad concept
of derivative litigation in Capital Market Law on this provision also points out
that there should be violations of Capital Market Law and or its implementing
regulations and the losses deriving from its violation need to be proven before the
action brought to a court against a violator.
In practice, it is unclear as to whether the violation must first be proved by
the authorities, OJK or it can be proved through a court together with the claim
for compensation. In one case, the court interpret Bapepam LK (now OJK) as an
extrajudicial organization and based on its function, any breach of capital market
law must be prove first by the Authority before any claim for compensation due to
the violation in capital market law and its implementing regulations. 75 The court
refers to the Article 5 of the Capital Law that stipulates the organisation has the
authority ‘to inspect and investigate any Person with respect to suspected violations
of this Law or its implementing regulations’.76 If this decision is being followed by
other next cases, there will be long process for investors to pursue compensation
due to violation in capital market law and its implementing regulations. On
the other hand, if Article 111 of the Capital Market Law is defined in a broad
interpretation, Indonesian court can also exercise violation in capital market law in
order to decide the award of compensation.

III.The Implementation of Shareholder’s Protection in Indonesian
Listed Companies
According to the last IOSCO Report, ‘the initial and ongoing disclosure
regimes, minority shareholders protection in Indonesia are in place and being
enhanced’.77 As the success of law reform not only focuses on legal structures
and substantive law, but also on the implementation, below I discuss how the
law is implemented through the current cases. A study on the implementation
on Corporate Governance in Indonesia, June 1999 conducted by Bapepam
concluded that the Indonesian regulatory framework has covered almost all
the principles of corporate governance in the OECD. However, the challenge of
implementation remains as the cases below show.
A. PT Bumi Resources Tbk case

The potential expropriation of minority shareholders occurred when
the company, PT Bumi Resources Tbk (Bumi Resources) conducted a takeover
74
The definition of Person in art 1(23) of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1995
Concerning Capital Market applies to a natural person, a company, a partnership, an association or any
organized group.
75
Abdul Malik Jan v PT Media Nusantara Citra Tbk, dkk, Decision of the District Court of Central
Jakarta No 29/PDT.G/2011/PN.JKT.PST (21 June 2011).
76
Article 5 Law No 8 of 1995 Concerning Capital Market.
77
Financial Sector Assessment Program, ‘Indonesia: Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation’ (IMF Country Report No 12/189, IMF, July 2012) 8.

Volume 4 Number 1, January - April 2014

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 130 ~

transaction. Under the control of Bakrie business group, PT Bumi Resources
has its main business in gas and mining.78 The Bakrie family is a prominent
business family in Indonesia involved in various and important Indonesian economic
sectors, including oil and gas, palm oil, property, mining, telecommunications and
finance.79 The founder of this family business is Abdurizal Bakrie, a politician.80
Due to his position, many critics point out a possible conflict of interest between
his business group and the family’s political connections.81 The issue of conflict of
interest between Bakrie’s strong position in Indonesian politics and his business
have been discussed and criticized, particularly in a recent corporate action taken
by PT Bumi Resources Tbk.82
It has been alleged that the acquisition of three coal companies by PT
Bumi Resources Tbk breached the capital market regulations. Nevertheless, the
Bapepam LK had not yet enforced this case. Following this, there has been debate
and difference in interpreting the law between the regulator and regulated entity in
this case, particularly Bapepam Rule No. IX.E.2 2001.
In this case, the capital market supervisory agency has been criticized for
its perceived failure to properly enforce the law’.83 In order to gain understanding
in what is the core of the problematic acquisition by Bumi Resources, the
interconnection between what is written in the regulations and its implementation
are discussed below, along with this the debatable interpretation and how the
authority responded.
Was there any material transaction on the acquisition by PT Bumi
Resources Tbk?
While the supervising board, Bapepam LK indicated that the acquisition
was a material transaction and changed the main business activity, PT Bumi
Resources Tbk insisted that the acquisition was not a material transaction
because the corporate actions cannot be interpreted as one action.

Through its subsidiary company, PT Bumi Resources Investment
(whose shares are controlled by Bumi Resources) took over the three

78
Bumi Resources was established in 1973 and became Public in 1990 under the name of PT
Bumi Modern Tbk in which its shares were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange and Surabaya Stock Exchange.
Previously, the majority shares of Bumi Resources held by PT Asuransi Jiwa Bersama Bumiputera 1912 as a
controlled shareholder, but in 1997 the shares were sold by PT Asuransi Jiwa Bersama Bumiputera 1912 to
PT Bakrie Capital Indonesia. From that takeover, the portion of shares held by PT Bakrie Capital Indonesia
was 58.51%. Since the takeover, the main business was changed from hotel and tourism to oil, gas and mining. In 2000, PT Bumi Modern Tbk changed its name to PT Bumi Resources Tbk.
79
The Economist (2010) ’Face Value: Indonesia’s Teflon tycoon, Aburizal Bakrie has survived controversy in business and politics’, 14t Jan <http://www.economist.com/node/15278524>.
80
Abdurizal Bakrie is the Chairman of the Golkar Party and a candidate for Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential elections. Previously, in 2004 to 2005 he served as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare and
then in 2004 to 2005 he was Coordinating Minister for the Economy. Although, Abdurizal Bakrie lost his
position as Minister, he is still managing the reins of Golkar.
81
Guerin, Bill (2006) ‘Politics and business mix in Indonesia’, Asia Times, 22 July <http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG22Ae01.html>.
82
Krismantari, Ika (2009) ‘Bapepam probes Bumi Resource’s auditors’, The Jakarta Post, 31 January
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/31/bapepam-probes-bumi-resource%E2%80%99sauditors.html>.
83
Jakarta Globe (2009) ‘Bapepam’s Bumi Probe a ‘Charade,’ Analyst Charges’, 17 June <http://
www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/bapepams-bumi-probe-a-charade-analyst-charges/>.
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targeted companies, PT Fajar Bumi Sakti, PT Pendopo Energy Batubara, PT
Darma Henwa Tbk. The value of these three transactions was IDR 6,2 Trillion.
Each transaction has a value, IDR 2.47 Trillion with PT Fajar Bumi Sakti, IDR
1,3 Trillion with PT Pendopo Energy Batubara, and IDR 2,4 Trillion with PT
Darma Henwa, Tbk.84

There was a time sequence for each transaction. The acquisition
transaction of PT Fajar Bumi Sakti, through its holding company, Leap
Forward Finance Ltd was conducted on 26 December 2008 under the Share
Purchase Agreement. The second acquisition transaction of PT Pendopo
Energy Batubara, through its holding company, Pendopo Coal Ltd was
conducted on 5 January 2008 under the Share Purchase Agreement. While the
third transaction was conducted on 23 December 2008 through the holding
company of PT Darma Henwa, Tbk, Goodrich Management Corp under the
Share Purchase Agreement.

The law applied at that time was Bapepam LK Rule Number IX.E.2 which
was enacted in the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-04/PM/2000 dated
20 February 2001 on the Material Transactional and Core Business Shifting
(Bapepam Rule No. IX.E.2 2001). Based on the definition in this regulation,
‘Material Transaction means any purchase, sale, or shares participation, and/
or any purchase, sale, transfer, exchange of assets or business segment with a
total value equal or greater than one of following:
a. 10% of a company’s revenue, or
b. 20% of a company’s equity.’85
If the transaction falls within the above definition, ‘the Issuer and
Public Companies must obtain approval from Shareholders General Meeting
in accordance with procedures and requirements stipulated by the regulation
no. IX.E.2 2001’.’86

At the time of the three transactions, 20% of the revenue of PT Bumi
Resources Tbk was about IDR 2,5 Trillion in 2007 and about IDR 3,7 Trillion
in 2008. At the time 20% of the equity in 2007 were IDR 2,47 Trillion and in
2008 were about IDR 3,48 Trillion.87 If the above financial report was linked to
the value of the three corporate actions by PT Bumi Resources Tbk then those
three transactions fall within the definition of material transaction in Regulation
No IX.E.2 2001.
However, if we refer to the definition in Regulation No IX.E.2 2001, the
materiality of the transaction refers to “any purchase”. The argument by the
management of PT Bumi Resources Tbk was that those transactions were not in a
series of transactions because they were conducted at different times, with different
parties, and with different objects. Before the final investigation was finished,
Bapepam LK and Indonesian Stock Exchange stated that those transactions were
a series of transactions, thus falling within the definition in Regulation No. IX.E.2
2001.88
84
85
86
87
88

Bumi Resources’s Financial Report 2008.
Point 1Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 2001.
Point 2 Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 2001.
Bumi Resources’s Financial Report 2007 and 2008.
Bapepam LK stated opinion in several news that the deals in Bumi’s transactions may be sub-
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There are also strong potential expropriation of public shareholders in these
transactions because the prices of the transactions are far above their book value.
While the company and its parent company, PT Bakrie & Brothers is already
heavily indebted, these transactions will also put further burden on the company.89
However, after the investigation, Bapepam-LK concluded that the
acquisitions did not constitute a material transaction because those transactions
took place in different fiscal years.90 The result then, PT Bumi Resources Tbk had
been let off from the material transaction contravention. PT Bumi Resources Tbk
benefited from the regulation loopholes to avoid an obligation to gain approval from
the Shareholder General Meeting in accordance with procedures and requirements
in capital markets regulations. In this case, Bapepam LK acknowledged the
weakness of regulatory framework. As a result, in 2011, the Material Transaction
regulation was being revised,91 changing the definition of material transaction from
‘any transaction’ to ‘a series transactions’.
B. PT Media Nusantara Citra Tbk case

PT Media Nusantara Citra Tbk (MNC Group) is the biggest player in
Indonesia media, particularly television.92 This group is controlled by Hary
Tanoesoedibjo, a prominent businessman who recently joined the Political Party.93
In 2011, MNC Group was sued by one of its public shareholders in District
Court of Central Jakarta. The object of the dispute is the allegation of misleading
information in MNC Group prospectus when the company did the initial public
offering in 2007.
The plaintiff sued the company on the basis that the company should have
disclosed the dispute with its subsidiary company; PT TPI (now called MNC
TV). The plaintiff argues that the dispute over PT TPI was a material fact because
this subsidiary company gives 21% contribution of income to the MNC Group.94
Furthermore, the materiality of this information can be proven when the price of MNC
Group’s shares decreased due to the exposure of the dispute over the ownership of
PT TPI since 2010. Thus, the plaintiff insisted that he suffered loss due to misleading
information in MNC Group’s prospectus. The rationale is that if the information
about the dispute over the TPI ownership95 was published in prospectus, investors
stantial and material according to capital market regulation. See i.e, the Jakarta Post, 2009.
89
Krimantari, Ika (2009) ‘Stock Market: Bapepam to probe Bumi shopping spree’, The Jakarta Post,
13 January <http://lgtv.thejakartapost.com/index.php/read/news/194993>.
90
Obor, Yohanes (2009) ‘Bapepam-LK Says Bumi’s Acquisitions Appear Clean’, The Jakarta Globe,
26 January <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/bapepam-lk-says-bumis-acquisitions-appearclean/>.
91
Bapepam-LK Rule Number IX.E.2 2011.
92
This group owns three of the country’s largest television networks, RCTI, MNC TV and Global TV.
Together, these three television networks control 37% of the national television audience. Besides television networks, MNC Group also owns a regional broadcasting network, Sindo which operates 21 regional
TV stations and 16 radio stations. Other media networks owned by MNC Group are Seputar Indonesia, the
daily national newspaper and news website, Okezone.
93
Infoasaid (2012) ‘Indonesia Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide’, Infoasaid, 30 November
<http://www.infoasaid.org/sites/infoasaid.org/files/indonesia_guide_-_final_271112_20.12.12.pdf>.
94
Abdul Malik Jan v PT Media Nusantara Citra Tbk, dkk, Distric of Central Jakarta Court Decision,
No 29/PDT.G/2011/PN.JKT.PST (21 June 2011).
95
Basically, the background of the dispute over the ownership of PT TPI started when Harry Tanoe
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After the decision of the Supreme Court was released, the MNC Group
share price dropped by 10.34%. Following the price declines, the IDX temporarily
suspended the stock’s trading in order to avoid unfair trading.96 The IDX head of
assessment for services companies has stated that the decision to suspend the MNC
Group stock trading followed the Supreme Court’s ruling on the TPI ownership
dispute.97
Although, it has been noted that there is a significant reform through
more rigorous disclosure rules with focus on monitoring and enforcing of rules
and regulations, this case depicts that the implementation of timely and reliable
disclosure is either not necessary or desirable on the side of companies. The desire
not to comply with disclosure regulations might derive from the typical ownership
of many Indonesian companies which is heavily centralized, which leads to the
mind-set that there is no incentive for being transparent.
The characteristic of most Indonesian companies such as concentrated
ownership, pyramiding, structure of group companies and cross shareholdings
might not motivates them to be transparent without any incentive.98 On the
other hand, within the centralized ownership, the implementation of corporate
governance, such as through compliance to disclosure procedures might be seen as
a costly managerial exercise, which will not be appreciated by corporate managers
and owners.99 It seems that Indonesian capital markets players still do not see the
benefit of being transparent which would make it more attractive for companies to
carry out Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Indonesia and for investors to put their
capital in public listed companies.100
through PT Berkah Karya Utama lent TPI about US $ 53 Million because at the time TPI was in debt after the
1998 crisis. At that time, TPI was owned by Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut), former President Suharto’s
eldest daughter. As Hary lent TPI money, he insisted on the right to convert the debt into equity. Nowadays,
MNC TV is controlled by MNC Group owned by Harry Tanoesodibjo who bought PT Berkah Karya Bersama.
The conversion of debt into equity reduced her position from majority shareholder to owning only 25%
percent of the TPI’s total shares.
Tutut challenged the equity conversion process in a district court. In 2011, Tutut won the appeal
but in 2012, the High court overturned the District Court’s decision in favour of Hary Tanoe. This decision
was then appealed by Tutut in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then granted Tutut’s appeal against
PT Berkah Karya Bersama. Although the dispute was between Tutut and PT Berkah karya Utama, this company is affiliated to Hary Tanoe. Furthermore, the object of the dispute was Berkah’s ownership in MNC
Group (previously TPI TV). MNC Group then acquired the 75% shares in MNC Group.
Although, Hary Tanoe insisted that the dispute over the TPI ownership has no correlation with
the MNC Group, the company that he controls, when the TPI shares were transferred from Siti Hardiyanti
Rumana to PT Berkah Karya Bersama, the owner of PT Berkah Karya Utama was Hary Tanoe. The above
information is extracted from The Jakarta Post, 2013; Bisnis.com, 2013; Indonesian IDX, 2013; Merdeka.
com, 2013.
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C. PT Sumalindo Tbk case

PT Sumalindo Tbk case also depicts the phenomenon of such
Indonesian corporate characteristics which result in the discrimination of
minority shareholder’s right. PT Sumalindo Tbk owns more than 30% of
Indonesian forest market. Moreover, PT Sumalindo Tbk is one of the top five
wood distributors in the world. The annual report of PT Sumalindo Tbk in
2012 stated that PT Sumalindo Tbk owns more than 840 thousand hectares
of nature forest and 73 thousand hectare of industrial plant forest. However
in five years, PT Sumalindo Tbk never mentioned its profits in the financial
report.101

To pursue his right, one of its minority shareholders, submitted a petition
to the district court to ask for inspection of the company’s books. The purpose of
the inspection is to obtain information in the event of suspicion that the company
has committed acts which break the capital markets Regulation Number IX.E.2
resulting in detriment to minority shareholders. In regards to this case, the district
court of South Jakarta accepted the application. Although, this decision was
appealed, on 12 September 2012, Supreme Court rejected the appeal from PT
Sumalindo Tbk.
In this case, the ground of the expropriation of minority shareholders’
rights derived from the corporate action conducted by the company in which PT
Sumalindo bought the Zero Coupon Bond from its subsidiary company without
paying a guarantee. Furthermore, this action was conducted before the approval
of the GMS. PT Sumalindo Tbk also made a sales and purchase agreement with
another subsidiary company to sell PT 60% Sumalindo’s shares without informing
to the other shareholders in General and Extraordinary Meetings of Shareholders.102
PT Sumalindo Tbk case shows the difficulty in implementing corporate
governance in Indonesian public listed companies due to the pyramid structures of
group companies. This situation has been compounded by the lack of transparency
and accountability. PT Sumalindo Tbk did not follow the corporate governance
according to the Capital Market Regulations in relation to the material transaction
mechanism. PT Sumalindo Tbk was supposed to obtain the approval from SGM
and the bond purchase should have been put on the SGM agenda, including a
specific session in the meeting to explain the reason of its purchase.
The characteristic of most Indonesian companies such as concentrated
ownership, pyramiding, structure of group companies and cross shareholdings
might not motivates them to be transparent without any incentive.103 On the
other hand, within the centralized ownership, the implementation of corporate
governance, such as through compliance to disclosure procedures might be seen as
a costly managerial exercise, which will not be appreciated by corporate managers
and owners.104 It seems that Indonesian capital markets players still do not see the
benefit of being transparent which would make it more attractive for companies to
101
Almawadi, Issa (2012) ’Kasus Bumi tunjukkan kelemahan pengawasan bursa’, Kontan, 17 Desember <http://investasi.kontan.co.id/news/kasus-bumi-tunjukkan-kelemahan-pengawasan-bursa>.
102
PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Tbk v Deddy Hartawan Jamin dan Imani United Pte. Ltd , Decision of
the Supreme Court No 3017 K/Pdt/2011 (12 September 2012).
103
Wulandari, Etty R and Asheq R Rahman, above n. 98, 93.
104
Ibid.

Volume 4 Number 1, January - April 2014

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 135 ~

carry out Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Indonesia and for investors to put their
capital in public listed companies.105
This existing legal culture in the Indonesian capital market becomes an
obstacle to the implementation of good corporate governance. The study suggested
that the important aspect to support the implementation of transparency as part of
corporate governance is legal culture.106 Without a high standard of self-discipline,
integrity and ethical values from board and top management, the compliance even
to the existing disclosure regulations might be difficult to be achieved. On the
other side of regulation, the absence of disclosure of beneficiary ownership might
also make more different the task to detect and observe opportunistic activities
and abusive transactions by controlling owners, such as related party transactions,
extract resources and asset from the company they control.

IV. Improving Commitment to Detecting and Punishing Violations
by Financial Supervisory Agency
Besides the low compliance of corporate governance from the side
of public listed companies, it is important to highlight the role of Financial
Supervisory Agency and examine what has been done and should be done.
Several critiques have been addressed to the role of Bapepam LK (now OJK)
in handling the above cases.107

In Sumalindo Tbk case for example, although the expropriation of a minority
shareholder in PT Sumalindo Tbk has been handled by the court through the right
of a shareholder to pursue investigation by submission to a court,108 OJK (former
Bapepam LK) might take an action in this case, protecting shareholders’ rights.
Based on Bapepam-LK Rule Number X.K.1 Concerning Disclosure of
Information that must be made public immediately, PT Sumalindo has an obligation
to report to Bapepam and make public any material information regarding events
that may affect the price of securities or investor’s decisions, not later than 2 (two)
working days after the event occurs.109 Some of the information that needs to be
disclosed is ‘any important litigation against the company and/or the company’s
directors or commissioners.’110 The Supreme Court decision in this case must be
evidence that there is litigation against the company that should be disclosed.
Basically, Bapepam-LK has power to ‘inspect and investigate any person,
issuers and Public Companies with respect to suspected violations of the Capital
Market Law or its implementing regulation’.111 The question from this case that I
105
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would like to highlight is the extent the Capital Regulator should be involved in
this case in order to protect the interest of investors and the public.
In Sumalindo Tbk case, Bapepam LK (now OJK) might get involved to
secure the public interest in order to prove the legal soundness of Indonesian
Capital Market. The purpose of the Capital Market Law is to provide a sound legal
foundation for persons that do business in the Capital Market and of protecting
the investing public against practices that may cause loss. Having stated that,
Bapepam LK (now OJK) should be involved in this case to ensuring the protection
of minority shareholders.
There has been a decision by the Supreme Court which ordered conducting
an examination of a Company in relation to material transactions allegations.
Regretfully, Bapepam-LK seems to be avoiding getting involved in investigating
capital markets cases as long as investors have claimed loss.112 Although, there is
not yet a report from the investors who claim loss to Financial Authority Services, a
more pro-active approach needs to be used. Bapepam LK (now OJK) can investigate
based on the Supreme Court decision. This can be used as an indication to start
investigations. As noted in Government Regulation Number 46 of 1995 Concerning
Investigation Mechanism in Capital Market Area, investigations can be done if there
is indication of violations of the Capital Market Law and regulations. In this case,
several news reports have published information in relation to this case.113
Based on the provisions mentioned, it is clear that the authority given
to Bapepam is powerful. It covers the power to regulate, investigate and to
sanction misconduct. While in financial market, the ultimate goal of regulation
is minimalist intervention designed to correct market failure,114 I would argue
that in the unfriendly legal protection environment for investors, such as
the case in developing countries, the effectiveness of enforcement should be
prioritised and maximised. This means, the more proactive approach from
the authority to give effect to the substantive law is needed in order to raise
investors’ confidence in Indonesian capital markets. Due to its urgency, this
priority should prevail over the skews of policy direction and regardless of
budgetary priorities and operational capacity.
If we look at the enforcement framework of capital markets regulations,
the regulatory objectives of the Capital Markets Law do not provide a clear
roadmap towards an enforcement strategy. In addition, the authority given by
the Law empowers Bapepam-LK with discretion in enforcing capital markets
regulations. This indicates that enforcement is unlikely to be the response to
every contravention.

In relation to that, the agency must put a priority to take on much more
total and systematic risk-based approaches of regulatory initiatives, such as in the
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada.115 In UK, the Financial
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Services Authority has adopted a risk based approach, an approach which reflects a
broad move in financial regulatory systems.116 Consequently, not all contraventions
are necessarily the subject of enforcement action. On the other hand, specific priority
areas may be targeted for action because of the implications they carry in terms of
risk to the statutory objectives. However, the shortage of this approach is that some
contraventions might be ignored or because of the low risk areas.117
In the case of Indonesia, as there is nothing in statutory framework that explicitly
or implicitly requires the authority to adopt such an approach in enforcing the law,
the outcome might be a policy choice made by Bapepam-LK. What is missing from
the approach taken by Bapepam-LK is that, there is no clear risk-based tools to be
used in measuring the overall risk posed to the authority’s objectives, for instance, a
mechanism that can score the risk against a number of probability and impact factors.
This system is that which has been adopted by the FSA.118
Having explored the reasons on the side of the financial regulatory
system, the actions taken by Bapepam-LK might be understandable. Yet,
since a system is only the tool, knowing the weaknesses of the regulatory
mechanism should be a starting point to improve the system itself. Thus,
without the willingness and a firm policy’s direction, the attitude for blaming
the authority for the weak enforcement might be continued.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

While the regulatory reform in corporate governance along with capital
market regulatory framework has continuously been conducted in response
to the market dynamic, the enforcement of shareholders’ protection is not
yet perceived by the regulated entities to be as effective and desirable for
regulatory credibility. The above three cases depict that financial transactions
that discriminate against minorities result from loopholes in the law and
weak enforcement of capital markets law.

Indeed, there has been improvement in enhancing the investor
protection through regulations. Some revised regulations in relation to the
issuer’s obligations to obtain minority shareholders’ approval and disclose
material transactions have been made. However, with the concentrated
structure of ownership, pyramiding structure of company and cross
shareholdings, a further effort to enhance disclosure and enforcement of
beneficial ownership need to be implemented by obligating the issuers to
reveal beneficiary ownership.
On the other hand, a study on the Indonesian corporate governance
behaviour concluded that the failure of corporate governance in Indonesian
public listed companies is due to ‘the neglected role of the legal culture in
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corporate governance systems’.119 The apparent behaviour that is depicted from
the above cases is that, there is tendency for corporate actors in Indonesia listed
companies to avoid the obligation derives from law as long as it can bring benefit
to their interest and this can be done safely.
As the aforementioned behaviour is exist in Indonesian corporate
governance, it is necessary to incorporate a mechanism to improve Indonesian
corporate governance with a measure to prevent that opportunistic behaviour which
might led to the shareholders’ expropriation. An alternative measure to improve the
awareness of Indonesian public listed companies to the importance of good corporate
governance, besides another hard law, is to introduce a mechanism which rates the
performance of corporations based on their compliance to the corporate governance
norms. This mechanism has been introduced in the ASEAN community.120 Though,
it has not been enforced, through ASEAN scorecard, Indonesia can fully apply
this mechanism to attract competition among public listed companies. Instead of
formulating the ASEAN Scorecard through regulation, the publication of scoring
based on corporate governance implementation might motivate companies to
improve good corporate governance. The idea is to utilize the use of scoring as the
credit rating agency does in rating debt securitization. Although it is not necessary
as the debt securitization market relies on ratings, investors might use the scores
on the corporate governance performance as investment parameters. By weighing
the performance of corporate governance through a scoring mechanism, investors
can choose whether they want to participate through shares in companies or not.
In addition, as a part of overall efforts to improve corporate governance
standards and practice in Indonesian capital markets, strengthening law enforcement
should be prioritized. Effective enforcement of the securities regulatory framework
is critical to the supervision credibility. Importantly, it is identified by the market
players as important to market confidence and development.
Since the Indonesian Financial Services Authority has a powerful authority
to conduct surveillance, inspections, investigations, and punishing violations, the
effectiveness of securities regulation enforcement depends on the supervisory
agency in exercising its powers. The enhanced power given to Financial Services
Authority requires a strong commitment to detecting and punishing violations
which affect investor trust. Under an enhanced enforcement program, particularly
for violations which concern breaches of mandatory, socially or ethically based
behaviours, the supervisory agency might use penal enforcement for criminal
violations. Besides, to give deterrent effect and in order to promote confidence,
efforts should be made to ensure that the market community is sufficiently aware
of all enforcement efforts. As substantive violations can take a long time to pursue
through court, it should also be noted that the processes should also be supported
by a supportive judicial system.
However, one should note that the primary function of s supervisory
agency in this area is to contribute to the effectiveness of the economic system
as a whole. Enforcing the law should not be interpreted as always implying the
use of penal enforcement activities and sanctions. Yet, as the public perception
that the enforcement in capital markets regulations is weak, transparency
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might be reinforced by enforcement. Surely, there is need for consistency
in enforcing the law, such as by adopting clear and consistent regulatory
processes.
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